Buddha Nature
and the concept of
person
By Sallie B. King
Philosophy East and West
Volume 39, no. 2 April
1989
P.151-170 (C) by University of Hawaii
Press
Buddhism has a
profound and
thoroughly developed set of
teachings on
human being. One might well argue that the question of human
being is the question par excellence with which
the Buddhist tradition as a whole
struggles. According to the
traditional account, for
example, the
point of departure for the Buddha's own search,
discoveries, and teachings was the dilemma of the
human condition. Moreover, vast numbers of
Buddhist texts speak out of or address human experience as such,
consciously focusing upon it as the source of both question and answer.
Nonetheless, many questions
a modern Westerner asks as a matter of
course about human being are not directly addressed in the
Buddhist texts. There are of course important reasons
for this. Our concept of and assumptions about human individuality are
profoundly different from Buddhist views of the same. Our two
worlds of discourse about the value and meaning of finite
bodily existence, the course of history, the meaning of
suffering, and the nature of
possible human
greatness are set up on entirely different foundations. Thus, for a
contemporary Westerner to ask the question "What is a person? What is a
human being?" of a
Buddhist text is to set oneself up to receive an answer that does not
satisfy the intent of the question. Yet, while Buddhist views and
assumptions differ so markedly from our own, Buddhist texts
reveal in their own way a
preoccupation with
the human condition as intent as that of our own hyperindividualistic,
anthropocentric culture.
With such a shared fixation, it is inevitable that
persons on both sides of the cultural boundaries will attempt to
gain light from the other side on this subject,
despite the incommensurability of each other's
questions and answers. The present essay is one such attempt: not an
East-West comparison, but an effort to
address a Buddhist text from the
perspective of cross-cultural philosophy (still, despite the name, a
thoroughly Western enterprise). Herein I will engage in dialogue the
Buddha Nature Treatise (Chinese: Fo
Hsing Lun (a); hereafter, BNT), a text
representative of the Buddha nature tradition that contains an
extensive discussion of the concept of Buddha nature, a crucial
component, if not the most crucial component, of the East Asian
Buddhist concept of human being. I will
attempt to wrest from the text answers to two categories of
questions--its view of the ontological nature of human being and its
view of the existential status of human beings. In the course of the
discussion I will ask such questions as: What roles do
individuality and freedom play in the view of human being
portrayed in this text? What value, if any, does an
individual human personality possess? Is there anything of value in
human history? Clearly, the text
itself does not speak in these terms; these are the questions of a
twentieth-century, philosophically inclined American. In
order to bridge the cultural gap, I will first give a summary
account of the text's concept of
Buddha
nature in its own terms and in its own format. Then,
acknowledging that the text itself neither speaks this language nor
shares my concerns, I will put
my questions to the text and attempt to
extract from the text its implications for the subject of my concern.
In other words, I cannot claim that the author of the BNT does make the
statements I
will give as responses to my questions about human being, but I do
claim that these views are
implicit in and follow from the statements he does make about Buddha
nature. Granting that human
freedom requires us to expect the unexpected, nonetheless,
I believe that if the author of the BNT were
here today and could engage in dialogue with me, as long as my
interlocutor remained consistent,
something close to the views I will articulate in the
course of this essay would emerge.
EXEGESIS OF THE BUDDHA
NATURE TREATISE'S CONCEPT OF BUDDHA NATURE
The Fo Hsing Lun
is attributed to Vasubandhu (T'ien-ch'in (b),
fourth
century) and translated into Chinese by Paramaartha
(Chen-ti (c),sixth century).(1) Only the Chinese
translation is extant; neither a Tibetan translation nor a Sanskrit
original survives. While it is not suspected that the text might be a
purely Chinese original, as it contains an extensive refutation of
several non-Buddhist Indian philosophical schools, there is a
considerable degree of doubt as to whether Vasubandhu actually wrote
the text. Takasaki and Hattori, for example, are
convinced that the text was not translated, but actually written, by
Paramaartha, on the basis of his knowledge of the Ratnagotravibhaaga.(2)
I
tend to agree with this view, although it
cannot be regarded as definitive. The BNT does share much of its text
with the Ratnagotravibhaaga,
but also contains extensive other material which
is of keen interest in its own right. It is largely this
latter material, unique to the BNT, that is the source
of this article.
We
should also note in passing that there are other difficulties
concerning our text. The circumstances of the text's
composition, translation (if it was
translated), and transmission are all very little known. There is no
record of the date and place of translation on
the manuscript. Ui dates the
text between 557 and
569, and Takemura places it at approximately 558.(3)
The text is four chuan (d) in
length.
The
subject of the entire BNT is the concept of Buddha nature. We
shall begin with a summary of the concept of Buddha nature as
presented in the BNT in its own terminology. With that in place, we
shall proceed to probe this
material from the perspective of cross-cultural
philosophy.
The
author begins defensively with three points intended to ward off
incorrect interpretations of his views.
(1) It is
incorrect to say either that Buddha nature exists or does
not exist. though it is correct to say that Buddha nature aboriginally
exists (pen yu(e)), as long
as this is understood as an
affirmation of each
person's ability to realize Buddhahood and not as a kind
of existence which can
stand in contrast to nonexistence.
(2) Buddha nature is
not an own-nature; an own-nature cannot be found where a phenomenon,
such as a person, is in process. The idea of an own-nature is therefore
to be discredited and thoroughly distinguished
from the
notion of Buddha nature.
(3) Emptiness is not merely a matter of negation; supreme truth
does not
merely negate worldly truth. The contents of emptiness or
supreme truth cannot be so
limited as to be
exhausted by functioning in a destructive manner; there must also be a
positive revelation in
emptiness. Therefore, since emptiness is not exclusively negative, it
need not conflict with a Buddha nature which, though not an own-nature,
is
affirmed as
existing aboriginally.(
4)
Our author then proceeds to discuss Buddha nature in
a
constructive fashion, explaining it in terms of three other concepts:
the three "causes,'' the trisvabhaava, and
tathaagatagarbha. Let us take these in turn. The
three Buddha nature "causes" are three aspects of
Buddha nature in its function as cause of the attainment of
Buddhahood. The three are given as the cause of attainability, the
prayoga cause, and the complete
fulfillment cause. They are discussed as follows.
The cause of
attainability is the Thusness revealed by the dual emptiness [of
persons and things]. Because of
this emptiness, one 'can attain' bodhicitta, prayoga, and so forth, up
to the dharmakaaya at the end of
the Path. That is why this cause is called 'can
attain'.
The
prayoga cause is called bodhicitta. With this mind, one can attain
the thirty-seven limbs of enlightenment,(
5) the
ten stages (da`sabhuumi) of the bodhisattva, the
ten perfections (paaramitaa), the auxiliary aids to practice, and, at
the end of the Path, the dharmakaaya. This is called the prayoga cause.
The
complete fulfillment cause is prayoga. With this prayoga, one
attains complete fulfillment of both the cause and the fruit
[of Buddha nature]. By fulfillment of the
cause is meant virtuous and wise action. Fulfillment of the fruit is
constituted by the three virtues of wisdom, the cutting-off of
delusion, and
loving-kindness.
Of
these three causes, the essential nature of the first is
unconditioned Thusness. The essential nature of the latter two causes
is conditioned resolution and action.
(794a)
According to this passage, Buddha nature should be
understood as three kinds
of cause. These three, however, all stem from the first cause, the
cause whose nature makes possible the attainment of Buddhahood and
whose essential character is unconditioned
Thusness. This constitutes the text's first direct statement as to what
the Buddha nature is: Thusness actuating one's efforts to attain
Buddhahood. As the
description of the three causes proceeds, we can see that
this initial urge towards the self-realization of the Buddha nature is
the basis which
progressively develops into bodhicitta, prayoga, and fulfillment, in
turn. The latter two causes, which are
based in the first, are simply constituted by various
aspects of Buddhist practice, or "conditioned resolution
and action."
The
author next moves on to a discussion of the three natures, that is, the
trisvabhaava of Yogaacaara
theory: the discriminating nature, parikalpita
svabhaava (fen-pieh hsing(f)); the
relative nature, paratantra svabhaava
(i-t'a hsing(g)): and the true nature,
parini.spanna svabhaava (chen-shih hsing(h)). He first defines
the general
meaning of each term:
The
discriminating nature is established on the basis of the use of the
language of provisional speech. If there were no such terms, then the
discriminating nature would not come into being. Therefore vou should
know
that this nature is merely a
matter of verbal
expression; in reality it has no essence and no
marks. This is what is called the discriminating nature.
The
relative nature is the principle (tao-li(i)) which manifests as the
twelve-fold chain of conditioned origination (Pratiityasamutpaada) . Because it
serves as a basis (i-chih(j) )for the discriminating nature, it is
established as the relative (i-t'a(k)) nature.
The
true nature is the Thusness (chen-ju(l)) of all things. It is the
nondiscriminating wisdom realm of the wise. For the
sake of purifying the [first] two natures, realizing the third [that
is, liberation], and
cultivating all virtues, the true nature is established.
(794b)
Despite this quite orthodox initial presentation of
the trisvabhaava, the
author of the BNT expresses the view that ultimately the
three natures reduce to two. After
discussing each of the three natures in turn, the text continues:
The
relative nature is of two kinds: pure and impure. The impure
relative nature comes into being on the basis of
discrimination. The pure relative nature comes into
being on the basis of Thusness. (794c)(
6)
This
scheme functionally supplants the standard tripartite scheme of the
trisvabhaava. According to
this analysis, the
relative nature, or conditioned origination, is the only reality.
Insofar as one experiences it in
the mode of discrimination, the discriminating nature
is operative; insofar as one experiences Thusness,
the true nature is operative. In this way, we can
see that the Buddha nature, which is constituted by all three natures,
is represented in a
nondistorted fashion by the pure relative nature, or,
what is equivalent, the true nature. The
Buddha nature, then, qua parini.spanna
svabhaava, is known by
its functions: purification of the other two natures, liberation, and
the cultivation of all
virtues. Its nature is equated with Thusness: the reality
of things as they are and knowledge of that reality.
The
final component of the Buddha nature is the tathaagatagarbha
(ju-lai-tsang(m)), which is itself, of course, a close
synonym of Buddha nature. It is stated in the
following quotation and repeated many times in this text
that all sentient beings "are" the tathaagatagarbha
in the sense that they are all beings whose true
nature is Buddhahood. The author stresses the point that the
tathaagatagarbha in the causal stage of the
person who has not yet begun to practice Buddhism is identical with the
tathaagatagarbha in the
fruition stage of the Buddha. The
tathaagatagarbha in the causal
stage is concealed from the individual, but it is in no way diminshed.
An analysis
of the three component terms of the compound tathaagatagarbha is given, two of
which are of interest to us here. The garbha of tathaagatagarbha is represented as
constituted by three categories. 'Garbha'
(tsang(n))
has three meanings. The first shows the
incomparability of the true realm (cheng ching(o)), since apart from
this realm of the Thusness of
Thusness (ju-ju ching(p)), there is no other realm which surpasses
it. The second shows the incomparability of the true practice (chen
hsing(q)). since
there
is no other superior wisdom which may surpass this
wisdom (chih(r)). The third makes manifest the
incomparability of the true fruit [of practice], since there is no
fruit which surpasses this one. This is why we speak of
incomparability. Since
this fruit encompasses (neng she tsang(s)) all
sentient beings, we say that sentient beings are (wei(t)) the tathaagatagarbha. (796a)
The
first component of the garbha
is the realm of the Thusness of Thusness,
or all of reality truly experienced. The second component is Buddhist
practice, which is equated
with wisdom. Finally, the third item is the fruit of practice, namely,
realization of the
Buddha nature together with its virtues.
The analysis of the tathaa (ju(u) ) of tathaagatagarbha (ju-lai-tsang(m) )
is also instructive for our purposes.
All sentient beings
are (shih(v) ) the tathaagatagarbha.
There are two meanings of 'Thus' (ju(u) in ju-lai-tsang(m) ) . The
first is the knowledge of the Thusness of Thusness (ju-ju chih(w)), and
the second is the realm of the Thusness of
Thusness (ju-ju ching(x)). Since the two stand together, we speak of
the Thusness of Thusness (ju-ju(y)).(795c)
We
will return below to the significance of the special concept of the
Thusness of Thusness given here. For now,
the point is to recognize that Thusness is here represented
as the essential nature of
the
tathaagatagarhha. This
exegesis of tathaa, when combined with that of
garhha, produces a notion of
tathaagatagarbha which parallels the explanation of Buddha nature as
three causes. In each, Buddha nature or tathaagatagarbha is portrayed as in
essence Thusness, while Thusness is given as inherently linked
with
Buddhist practice. When we combine these
passages, we get the following. The essential nature of
tathaagatagarbha and of Buddha
nature is
Thusness. Thusness is the ground of the possibility of our
(successfully) practicing Buddhism. The ultimate
outcome of Buddhist practice, of course, is
realization of the goal of Buddhism, or the fruit of practice. Buddha
nature and tathaagatagarbha,
then, as Thusness are reality and the correct apprehension of
reality; as portrayed in this tripartite scheme, they are the
foundation of the possibility of
practice in Thusness, the doing of the practice itself, and the
successful fulfillment of that practice. Much the same conclusion
resulted from the analysis of the trisvabhaava.
In a separate part of the text, the author further
elucidates the BNT's concept of Buddha nature by attaching to it the
concept of aa`srayaparaav.rtti
(chuan-i(z)). The author of the BNT introduces the aa`srayaparaav.rtti into his
discussion by
describing it as the supreme purity which is revealed when all
limitations on the understanding have
been removed; it is the "purity of the original nature'' (pen
hsing(aa)), that is, the Buddha nature (801b).
The
central point of the BNT's exposition of aa`srayaparaav.rtti is
that it represents Buddhist practice. This is
expressed in four senses.
(1) As the "productive basis" it is the
basis of the Buddhist Path, a synonym for
Buddhist practice. The term "basis'' (aa`sraya, Chinese i(ab)) does not
refer here to a
substantive basis, but to the basis or foundation of a particular form
of action, Buddhist practice.
(2) AA`srayaparaav.rtti as
the destructive basis
accounts for the negative aspect of Buddhist practice, the
extinction of defilements. In accordance with tathaagatagarbha thought,
the text states that the
extinction of defilements is constituted by
the realization of their ultimate unreality.
(3) The
third characteristic, the "fruit of well-matured contemplation, "
represents the positive aspect of
Buddhist practice: practice as the realization of Buddhist truths. This
characteristic, which represents the heart of Buddhist practice as such
in all of its stages, emphasizes the Path of Buddhism and Buddhist
practice as inherently positive: one attains profound and extensive
reverence for and knowledge of Thusness. We
should note in passing that the negative aspect of overcoming delusion
is so far deemphasized that it
is said that actually no such thing is done, while the positive aspect
is emphasized to the
extent that it is identified with Buddhist practice as such.
(4) Finally, the aa`srayaparaav.rtti
represents the culmination of Buddhist practice in the supreme
realization of ineffable Thusness. In this way, the four
characteristics represent aa`srayaparaav.rtti
as Buddhist practice from its beginnings to its culmination (801).
QUESTIONS FROM A
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTTVE
Thus far we have worked through a substantive
discussion of the
Buddha nature, an analysis of it as "cause" and of its
synonyms. Being familiar with all this, we now need to
take the difficult step of relating this
material to a concept of the person. First, let me
specify that I am using the word "person" as an equivalent of "human
being,'' or "human individual." Thus what I seek in the text is a
systematic account of its philosophical anthropology.(7)
This raises an important preliminary issue. Insofar as I am seeking to
discover what the text
has to say about the nature of human being, there is, at first glance,
a somewhat poor fit with the
concept of Buddha nature. The bottom-line statement in the Buddha
nature textual tradition is:
"all sentient beings (sattva, Chinese chung-sheng(ac) ) possess the
Buddha nature.'' Entailed by the Buddha nature concept in particular
and the
Buddhist perspective in general is the view that human
beings as a class belong in the larger world of
sentient existents, and should not be singled out as special or unique
and thus deserving to be
regarded as a class unto ourselves. This is a very
important and well-known point in Buddhist thought. Human beings are
not a separate class, distinct from
animals, gods, and so forth. On the other hand, Buddhism has always
recognized that
there is a unique feature of the human condition which, while it does
not put us in an entirely separate class,
does
make the human race special with respect to
Buddhist soteriology. This special feature is the fact that we are
capable of understanding our
condition
and responding in such a way as to alter radically the parameters of
our existence. This may account
for the fact that in the BNT, the text repeatedly speaks in terms of
the three categories of
ordinary persons (fan fu(ad)), bodhisattvas or sages (p'u
sa(ae) or sheng jen(af)), and buddhas (fo(ag)) (see,
for example, 806b). Thus, in
the mind of our
author too, it is necessary to single out human beings (or
at least anthropomorphic beings) in order to
speak of our condition and our potential. Since the
text does repeatedly use this framework for its
analysis, there is no great gap between its
perspective and my question, "What is a (human) person?"
The purpose of the present section of this article
is to
step back from the immersion in technical Buddhist
terminology which dominated our discussion of the Buddha
nature and to ask questions of that material from the perspective of
cross-cultural philosophy. With the basic data now available in the
language and from the perspective of the BNT, we now
want to ask in our language and from our
perspective such questions as: What is a human being, a person?
What roles do individuality and freedom play in this concept? What
value, if any, does an individual
human personality possess?
What
is a person, according to the Buddha Nature Treatise? There are two
dimensions to this question, an existential dimension and an
ontological-metaphysical dimension. (8) To
discover what a person is
according to the latter dimension requires of us that we
clarify what it means to say that a person "exists." What is the nature
of this existence? What is the
meaning of the word "person" in the phrase "personal existence"? To ask
what a person is in an
existential sense is to ask what behaviors--in the
broad sense of all physical and psychological acts--are characteristic
or paradigmatic for human persons. How would we characterize the
essence of human character? What possibilities intrinsically belong to
human beings and in what way are these
possibilities actualized? Of course, since the text does not pose these
questions in this way,
it also does not answer them in an explicit manner. What follows is my
own interpretation of the
implications of the textual material for these
questions posed from outside, by a person who lives in a
culture dominated by another world view.
A. The
Ontological-Metaphysical Dimension It is amply clear that, like other
forms of Buddhism, the Buddha
nature thought of the BNT is a form of process philosophy.
There are no entities of any
sort recognized in
the text; there is no-thing which simply "is." Moreover,
the process philosophy of the BNT expresses the author's most basic
concerns, namely, to promote
Buddhist practice and to explain
philosophically the human transformation engendered by that practice.
There are two main points to the BNT's understanding
of the
ontological nature of a
human
person: first, a person is not an entity of any kind,
but consists of actions; and second, a person does not
exist in contradistinction to a world, but is correctly conceived as
inseparable from that
world. We will begin with the first point.
When
I say that the author of the BNT speaks of the ontological nature
of a human being as a series of acts, I mean that he
identifies the person with a particular series of
physical and psychological acts and indicates that this is the entirety
of the person; there is no
entity which performs the acts. This, of course, is
the classic Buddhist position from very early times.
The
following examples will give the reader an idea of the way in which the
BNT conveys this perspective. I can do no
more than give a handful of examples: if one were to read the BNT
itself, one would find that this
perspective pervades virtually every line of the
text. Moreover, the text does not struggle towards this position as
towards a conclusion,
but speaks out
of this perspective as a starting point.
First example: above, Buddha nature as "cause" was
explained as
Thusness actuating human effort to attain Buddhahood. As human beings,
then, our essential character is found in this deep-seated urge, whose
character is clearly verbal, or active, rather than entitative. This is
ontologically significant, since we possess this character by virtue of
our participation
in reality. This reality of
Thusness itself,
from which we are not separate, expresses itself in an active,
nonentitative fashion.
Second example: the true nature, as another term
descriptive of
Buddha nature and hence of human being, is explained in terms of three
kinds of action: purification (of the deluded and relative natures),
liberation,
and the cultivation of the Buddhist virtues. It is not
a thing, but these acts.
Third example: the second component of tathaagatagarbha is given
as Buddhist practice, which is equated with wisdom.
Note here that since wisdom is employed as interchangeable with
Buddhist practice, it cannot be interpreted as representing any
kind of static or substantial basis of subjectivity (such as a pure
mind or self). Practice y (such as a pure
mind or self). Practice is a kind of
doing, and wisdom is a particular practice--acting or doing
wisely.
Fourth example: aa`srayaparaav.rtti is defined as
Buddhist ractice. As such, it is consistently portrayed as being of an
active character. Any idea that the
"transformation of the basis" refers in some literal sense to the
transformation of a substantive thing must
be rejected in the light of this direct identification of
aa`srayaparaav.rtti with the doing of Buddhist practice. "Buddhist
practice" here does not mean any set rituals, meditations, or
ethical observances, but rather the process of the
self-transformation of the individual progressing from a
self-centered and ignorant mode of being-behaving to the selfless,
awakened, and compassionate mode of a
Buddha. The "transformation of the basis," then, means
the transformation of the person.
In
this text, then, aa`srayaparaav.rtti
is best interpreted as:
(l) the
radical transformation of the
person;
(2)
Buddhist practice;
(3) the transformation of
the person's relationship to the Buddha nature. AA`srayaparaav.rtti demonstrates
that the
affirmation of the Buddha nature is an affirmation of every
person's ability radically to transform him- or
herself. The Buddha nature, then, is not that which lives the
Buddhist life; it is the active, verbal doing or
living of the life.
Fifth and final example: the text identifies the
Buddha nature with the four gu.napaaramitaa, or supreme perfections,
one of which is aatmapaaramitaa,
perfection
of self. While this sort of
language makes the
Buddha nature sound like an entity par excellence, the text removes the
possibility of such an
understanding by explaining aatmapaaramitaa as
the active realization of the emptiness of all
things; in other words, it simply gives the name aatmapaaramitaa to experiential praj~naapaaramitaa.
All the heterodox
perceive and grasp a self within the five skandhas. Overturning that
attachment to self as vacuous and
cultivating
praj~naapaaramitaa,
one realizes the supreme
not-self which is identical to the self-
paaramitaa (wo p'o-lo-mi(ah)). This
is the fruit [of the
practice of
praj~naapaaramitaa].
(798c)(
9)
The second important theme concerning the
ontological nature of
the preson is the view that a person does not
exist in any way separate from a world. The perspective of
the BNT is plainly opposed to any such subject-object split. In the
BNT, personal being, is always
continuous with the being of a world. The trisvabhaava are three ways
(actually two, according to the author's interpretation) in which the
person experiences what is
given (the world), and in which what is given (the world) presents
itself
to the person. In fact, even this way of speaking
fails to do justice to the continuity between
person and world. A person is a series of events which, in the language
of subjectivity, are called experiences. But experiene, in fact, is not
a matter of pure subjectivity. Experience is always "experience of"
something. Experience is
ordinarily conceived as the point of contact between a subject and an
object. But in the BNT these two are
portrayed as a single, primitive given, unified in itself, and only
divisible upon
secondary analysis. Ontologically. then, a person is this primitive
given: an experiential
world or a
personal world.
The inseparability of subject and world is conveyed
rather nicely in the following passage, mentioned above.
All sentient beings are
(shih(v) ) the tathaagatagarbha
(ju-lai-tsang(m)). There are two meanings of 'Thus'
(ju(u) in ju-lai-tsang(m)). The first is the knowledge of the Thusness
of Thusness (ju-ju chih(w)) and
the second is the realm of the Thusness of Thusness (ju-ju
ching(x)). Since the two stand together, we speak of
the Thusness of Thusness (ju-ju(y)). (795c)
While the exposition offered in this passage is
circular, its meaning is nonetheless clear. The author unpacks the
meaning of Thusness (the single ju(u)) by identifying it as
the sum of two elements: the
knowledge of the Thusness of Thusness and the realm of the Thusness of
Thusness. The term
translated here as "knowledge" (chih(r)), is a
standard term for the subjective, while "realm" (ching(ai)) is
a standard term for the objective. Ordinarily the chih is the cognizer
and the ching the cognized. In
the case of the knowledge of
the Thusness of
Thusness (ju-ju chih(w) and the realm of the Thusness of Thusness
(ju-ju ching(x)), the former is the
knowing which accords with the principle of Thusness,
and the latter is the known which accords with that
principle. Since, the author says, the two "stand
together," the term Thusness as ju-ju(y) is coined to
embrace them simultaneously. As such it represents the unity of their
mutuality. All of this--the ju-ju(y) Thusness of Thusness with both its
subjective and objective constituents--is given in explanation of the
single "Thus'' of tathaagatagarbha
(the ju(u)
of ju-lai-tsang(m)). We could not ask for a more direct statement of
subject-object unity in
Thusness.
In a
section devoted to the elucidation of the Middle Path, the author of
the BNT provides an example which is intended to
discredit the practice of "discriminating the
grasper and the grasped and taking them
really to exist." In other words, the intention here is to
discredit the idea of discrete subjects and objects.
Discriminating grasper and grasped and taking them
really to
exist: in the suutra, the Buddha uses a magician as an
illustration to draw us away from these two
extremes.(10) "Kaa`syapa, it is like a magician
who
conjures magical images. The tigers which he makes turn around
and devour the magician. Kaa`syapa, when bhik.sus whose method of
contemplation is like
this contemplate an object, what appears [to them] is
merely empty. Hence, there is nothing to
the 'real' and no reality to the false."
How
then can one escape the extremes [of grasped and grasper] and
by relying on the manovij~naana
(i-shih(aj))(11)
create consciousness-only wisdom? Consciousness-only wisdom
(wei-shih chih(ak)) is the wisdom [constituted by
the understanding that] all sense data [gu.na] lack an essence. When
this consciousness-only wisdom is perfected, it turns around and
extinguishes its own root, namely, manovij~naana.
How is this? Since the sense data lack essence,
manovij~naana is not produced.
With the manovij~naana not produced, consciousness-only wisdom
self-destructs. Manovij~naana
is like the magician; consciousness-only wisdom is like the magical
tiger. Since manovij~naana
produces consciousness-only
wisdom,
when the contemplation of consciousness-only is perfected it can turn
and destroy manovij~naana.
Why? Because sense data lack being (wu(al)). Thus
manovij~naana is not produced,
just as in the example the magical tiger turns and devours the
magician. As AAryadeva (T'i-p'o(am)) says in verse,
Throughout the three
realms,(
12) the origin of manovij~naana Is
always to be found in sense data. When one perceives that sense data
have no essence Seeds of existence are naturally extinguished. (809b-c)
This
example demonstrates the text's assertion of the nonduality of
the grasped "object" and the grasping "mind.'' The argument adheres
closely to Yogaacaara doctrine. Yogaacaara agrees with Madhyamika that
all sense data are inherently unreal, that is,
lacking in any nature of, their own, and that a Buddhist should
practice in order to realize this. The peculiarly Yogaacaara point is
that sense data are unreal since they are
produced by the mind. It is crucial to realize, though, that the mind
likewise is
produced by the sense data. If there were no sense data "objects,"
there would be no cognizing of
sense data and hence, immediately, no cognizer qua separate self.
Thus we rely on the manovij~naana, or ordinary
consciousness, to produce so-called "consciousness-only wisdom, " the
knowledge that sense data or
phenomena lack essence, and hence ultimately lack
reality. In other words, starting from the stage of
ordinary consciousness in which the practitioner finds him- or herself,
as a skillful means one engages
in unspecified meditative practices which
enable one to see the nonexistence of essences in phenomenal
reality. Once one has done that, however, this new awareness which one
has engendered possesses the
power to turn on that which produced it, ordinary
consciousness, and destroy it. Why?
Consciousness-only wisdom sees there are no object-things "out there.''
In effect, it directs manovij~naana
to
see this. With no objects from which to separate itself, manovij~naana, in turn, becomes
incapable of discriminating itself as a separate thing with its own
selfcontained essence-identity, In
other words, if there are no objects, there can be
no subject, the existence of each is completely dependent upon the
existence of the other. Thus manovij~naana,
as a sense of a separately existing self, is destroyed. Once this
happens, though, the so-called "consciousness-only wisdom"
self-destructs. Why? First, it was simply a skillful means for the
purpose of undoing the self-delusion of manovij~naana. Second, its
existence was derived from
manovij~naana; the latter
produced it.
What, then, is the nature and status of
the subject in this
theory? It is clear that with sense data as its cause, the manovij~naana consists totally in
cognizing activity. That is: no sense data, no cognizing; no
cognizing, no cognizer. The cognizing, then, is
the cognizer; in other words, there is no entity-cognizer here, only
acts of cognizing which
produce an illusory sense of self. As for "consciousness-only wisdom,''
it is plain that this is far from an
ultimate in this text. It is no more than a skillful means which
self-destructs once its task is accomplished. Moreover. the very words
"consciousness-only" (which are the words the text uses)
are misleading as used in the BNT. Though the phrase is appropriate
inasmuch as the sense data "objects" lack an independent essence
and hence are unreal, or do not exist, the real teaching of
this passage is that the cognizer and the
cognized, subject and object, are interrelated even to
the extent of being mutually dependent. They arise and
disappear together. Hence, "consciousness-only" does not mean simply
"consciousness-yes,
objects--no" (and certainly not "mind--yes, matter--no"), but rather it
implies "cognition only" or "cognizing only," with both "consciousness"
qua
mind and sense data qua objects of consciousness negated.
As
an illustration of the ontological status of a human person, this
example indicates several things.
(1) It manifests the nonduality of
cognizer
and cognized, or subject and object. It does not
reduce objects to an ultimate subjective base, but asserts the absolute
dependence,
relativity,
and ultimate unreality of both.
(2) It
demonstrates the active nature of the person; there is no
"mind" here, but certain kinds of cognitions and wisdom.
(3) The practical consequences of
"consciousness-only wisdom" consist in the elimination of delusion.
Thus, as an illustration of Buddha
nature, we see again in this example an
emphasis on the teaching that Buddha nature means the practice (or
engagement in the activity) of becoming
Buddha. This activity, again, is what a person is.
B. The Existential Dimension
Let us now take up the
question of human personhood in the existential dimension. A little
reflection will quickly reveal that in the view of the BNT's author,
one cannot speak of the human character or of paradigmatic human
behavior as such without one preliminary point.
Existentially human beings are of two basic types:
deluded and enlightened. Once one has divided humanity (in which
category I include the BNT's three divisions of
ordinary beings, sages, and Buddhas)
into these two camps, one can then proceed to make meaningful
statements about characteristic human
behaviors.
As evidence of this, recall the author's treatment
of the
classic Yogaacaara concept of the trisvabhaava, the three
"natures" which, as we have seen, represent three ways
in which persons perceive worlds and worlds present
themselves to persons. In working through these three natures, our
author divided the middle nature, paratantra,
into two subcategories, an impure and
a pure paratantra. The former was identifiable with
the nature of delusion, parikalpita,
while the
latter was identified with the pure
parini.spanna. In this way he
transformed the tripartite trisvabhaava
theory into a theory which divided humanity into
two categories.
The
characteristic which assigns persons to one or the other category is
so-called purity and impurity, or delusion and
enlightenment. Our author has in mind a model of human
being in which deluded beings transform themselves
into enlightened beings upon the pivot of aa`srayaparaav.rtti, which we
earlier translated as "the transformation of the person." but which we
can now translate as "conversion, "(13) in the
sense that it is the aa`srayaparaav.rtti
which
converts the person from a deluded being into an
awakened being. Thus we have two categories of person, before and after
aa`srayaparaav.rtti.
1. Before "conversion, " then, we have the "impure"
or
deluded
existential mode of human being. What characterizes human being in this
mode? In whichever existential mode a person finds him- or herself, a
human being is
always identifiable with Buddha nature. The significance of this for
the deluded person is
twofold. There is the universally valid promise of eventual
Buddhahood. More
interesting
for present purposes are the implications of the
doctrine of Buddha nature for a theory of human
nature. If the Buddha nature is the essential nature of a human
being, then there is, on this level and in this
context, a universal sameness shared by humanity at
the core of our identity. We are all intrinsically enlightened and
compassionate beings, and not
just in potential but always and already in present reality,
although all appearances and
self-knowledge may
be to the contrary while in the deluded existential mode. To the extent
that this hidden reality is not
yet manifest, though, the sameness which it implies is
all the greater. We can speak of it only as wisdom
and compassion and cannot specify its character
further; active manifestation is required for that.
On
the other hand, what does distinguish us one from another is our
individual karma and kle`sa,
the past history and
defilements which together are responsible for the creation
and constitution of our bodies as well as
what we, from a very different perspective, call our
various personalities. To the extent that a person exists in the
deluded existential mode, that
person's individual character traits, beliefs, habits, tendencies,
values, mannerisms, and so
forth
simply are kle`sa. They are
all based upon a
fundamentally deluded or warped perspective of
oneself and reality and could not exist as they are without that
foundation. They also, from the perspective
of Buddha nature thought, are unreal and
ultimately nonexistent. The text tells us many times that the
kle`sa have no basis in
reality.
We
therefore have a situation in which persons in the deluded existential
mode can only be differentiated one
from another by virtue of the kle`sa
which constitute
their personalities and have constructed their
bodies, but the kle`sa
themselves are unreal and
therefore cannot serve as any real basis of differentiation. The kle`sa, therefore, have no value in
constituting a person's identity. In the existential mode of delusion,
then, a person can truthfully be
identified with the universally identical Buddha nature but cannot
truthfully be identified with the distinctive kle`sa which constitute that
person's
individuality.
The
implications of this are as follows. Within the purview of Buddha
nature thought, the person in the deluded existential mode is
ahistorical and lacking in
individuality. History and individuality are comprised by
the kle`sa which constitute a
person's personality; since these are simply negligible, so are history
and individuality as pertaining to
persons in the deluded existential mode. Second,
autonomy and freedom are largely, though not entirely, negligible for
the deluded person. Most of the
deluded person's actions are driven by karma and as such identifiable
with the realm of kle`sa and
utterly
lacking in real freedom. However, there is one
important exception to this statement. Buddha
nature is Thusness impelling one towards Buddhahood. The drive to
spiritual freedom impelled by the Buddha
nature is an act of authentic freedom. Buddha nature
and Thusness, having nothing to do with the realm of
karma and kle`sa, can serve
as the basis of acts of real
freedom. Hence, to the extent that one acts in
such a way as to free oneself of karma and kle`sa,
one's act is free. To the extent that one's actions are the
product of past karma and kle`sa,
those actions are not free. By definition, though, the deluded person
has not yet undergone "conversion." Such a person will therefore be
largely defined by unfree
acts.
In sum, as presented in the BNT, the person (human
being) in the
deluded
existential mode is not a
person as we
ordinarily use the term in the popular Western sense. There is no real
historicality or individuality accruing to the "person" and precious
little freedom, What we consider to be the basis of
individual personhood is written off as unreal. What
is real is the universal sameness of Buddha nature; in this sameness,
individual personhood,
as we ordinarily use the term, cannot be found, Thus,
before "conversion" and while in the
existential mode of delusion, a person is not a person.
2.
What, then, of the person after "conversion," the "pure" or enlightened
person? Again we must begin by stating that the person is the Buddha
nature. Thus, also in the existential mode of enlightenment there
apparently is this degree of universal sameness.
But how far, in this mode, does this sameness extend?
The fact that we are all the Buddha nature means that we
are all characterized by clear seeing and altruistic
behavior. But persons in the
enlightened existential mode, unlike persons in the deluded mode, have
made this Buddha nature manifest in real acts of
clarity and altruism. This manifestation in action, therefore, brings
the Buddha nature into the realm of particularity and individuality. No
two acts of clarity or of compassion are alike. Hence, once the Buddha
nature moves into the realm of manifestation, it is no longer
appropriate to
speak of universal sameness, since the Buddha nature is no more than
those particular acts of clarity and altruism and no entity of any
kind.
In
other words, the person is the Buddha nature as manifest in particular
actions and only as manifest in those actions. Thus, history and
individuality, which were lacking in the deluded existential mode,
enter the constitution of the person now, in the
enlightened existential mode. The particular behaviors, mannerisms, and
even the personality of the
person now possess reality and value. Moreover,
the actions of the person now possess complete autonomy and freedom.
What the person does (physically, psychologically) has no relation to
the
world of karma and kle`sa,
but is entirely a spontaneous manifestation of the always free Buddha
nature. The
person, then, is really and fully a person at this
stage, after "conversion" and upon entry into the
enlightened existential mode.
We must emphasize this remarkable point:
"conversion" and
enlightened behavior not only do not rob a
person of individuality, but in fact constitute its very
possibility for the first time. Compare this with the
classic position of the Hindu Upani.sads, in which, upon enlightenment,
the person loses whatever individuality he or
she had by merging into the Oneness of
Brahman-AAtman, "as when
rivers flowing towards the ocean find there
final peace, their name and
form disappear,
and people speak only of the ocean."(14) The
position of
Buddha nature thought is the precise converse of this. Buddhist
practice constitutes the possibility for discovering and actualizing
individuality for the first time. One becomes a person upon
enlightenment. One gains freedom. The history which
one constructs with one's particular actions is a real
thing.
This, in the end, is the result of the position
epitomized in
the Buddha Nature Treatise's line which states that Buddha nature is
manifest in Thusness; one realizes it.
Attachments are not
real; therefore they are called vacuous. If one
gives rise to these attachments, true wisdom will not
arise. When one does away with these attachments,
then we speak of Buddha nature. Buddha nature is the
Thusness (chen-ju(l)) revealed (hsien(an)) by the dual emptiness of
person and things.... If one does
not speak of Buddha nature, then one does not understand
emptiness. (787b)
In the
view of the BNT,
Buddhist practice gains one something, and that
something is reality: one finds reality in
oneself and in one's world. And this reality possesses absolute
value. Just as the logic of Buddha nature thought compelled the author
ultimately to speak of
an aatmapaaramitaa in which the negativity of anaatman and `suunyataa was simultaneously
inverted and fulfilled, so here the negativity of the
karma and kle`sa-based realm
of historty and individuality is inverted and transformed into a realm
in which history and individuality are real
and valuable. Here, though, unlike the anaatmanaatmapaaramitaa inversion,
the history and personhood which one creates are something new. AAtmapaaramitaa is simply the
completely adequate
undersranding of anaatman. The free acts of a
real individual creating him- or herself, moment by moment,
are the construction of a historical world which never
before existed, even in potential.
3. We need now to consider the existential status of
the
pivot between the two existential modes of delusion and enlightenment,
namely, aa`srayaparaav.rtti
or
conversion. The status of aa`srayaparaav.rtti
is
not worked out as fully in the text as one
would prefer, but in the end it falls into the
category of the existential mode of enlightenment. AA`srayaparaav.rtti, it is said
many times, is "pure": it is the purity of the dharmadhaatu,
the
purity of the Buddha nature. As pure, it falls squarely on the side of
enlightenment. It is
also, however, identified with Buddhist practice: it
is the basis of the Buddha Way; the
foundation of the extinction of delusion; the fruition of
practice as manifest in goodness. reverence, and
knowledge; and it is the attainment of Thusness. In these
respects, its nature might at first seem to be
one that is transitional between delusion and purity, but that in fact
is not the case. When, as the text
says, one is "on the Way," aa`srayaparaav.rtti
is the cause. When one has "completed the Way," it is called "fruit."
Nonetheless, this aa`srayaparaav.rtti must finally be understood as
belonging totally on the side of purity and enlightenment, in short,
of
fruition. It is cause in the
same way that the
Buddha nature is cause: it is always fully complete with all its
virtues intact. It serves as cause of one's
being. "on the Way," or, in
other words, as
cause of the Buddha Way in the sense that, like Buddha
nature, it is the purity of Thusness impelling one to practice
Buddhism, impelling one to seek
freedom and the realization of personhood. AA`srayaparaav.rtti is capable of
serving as a pivot between
the two existential modes precisely because it is
purity in the act of causing one to be on the Buddhist Path. Like
hodhicitta, which is also
identified with the Buddha nature, it can be a first act on the
Buddhist Path. But even as a
first act, it is
already completely pure; it is purity that moves one
to perform that first act of stepping onto the Path, and the act itself
is constituted of purity.
There is in this notion that aa`srayaparaav.rtti is identifiable
both as purity and as Buddhist practice an anticipation of
Dogen's later concept of Buddhist practice as realization, To be sure,
this idea is in no way developed
in the BNT the way it is in
Dogen, but the germ of
Dogen's view is latently present here. In
the BNT, aa`srayaparaav.rtti
is called "pure'' in its role both as cause and as fruit. But, as we
have
seen, as cause it is already in full possession of its character as
fruit. We have here, then, a
notion in which every authentic act of Buddhist
practice is itself of the nature of fruition, the nature of the end of
the Path, of purity or
realization. A genuine act of Buddhist practice, whether the first
awakening of the desire to practice, an
advanced state of samaadhi,
or the dedication of oneself
to the salvation of others in perpetuity, is always a manifestation of
Buddha nature as such, which is
always of the character of full and complete clarity and altruism.
Purity and Buddhist practice, then, are alike. Thus aa`srayaparaav.rtti while always of
the nature of purity and fruition, can
nevertheless be identified with Buddhist practice.
Now
insofar as the crucial event which separates the deluded existential
mode from the enlightened existential mode is the act of conversion,
aa`srayaparaav.rtti, this
conversion itself must be crucial to the concept of
personhood embraced by the BNT. This act of
conversion which engenders real personhood is in effect the foundation
of personhood. If
there is any statement which can apply to both
modes of the existential dimension, and thus epitomizes the
existential nature of human beings as such,
it is that we are beings whose nature it is to transform ourselves, to
undergo radical transformation at the very foundation of personhood,
namely, at the foundation of act-genesis. The
deluded existential mode is the drive--however
convoluted--towards that event, while the enlightened existential mode
is the dynamic manifestation of that event, the ongoing manifestation
of free
personhood.
A Final Question
A final, and important,
question remains to us. When we combine our insights on the existential
and ontological aspects of human
personhood as suggested by
Buddha nature thought,
one apparent inconsistency remains. Buddha nature
thought universally affiirms, "all sentient beings
possess the Buddha nature.'' If, though, as I have argued
above, Buddha nature is not
an entity, but rather
certain kinds of acts, and if in the deluded
existential mode such enlightened acts by definition do not
appear, what is the status of Buddha nature for the
person in delusion? If, in short, Buddha nature is not an entity and if
it is not manifest in acts
while one is deluded, in what sense can it be
said to be there at all for that deluded person? It
would seem that Buddha nature could not be present under
such conditions. Yet the Buddha nature
tradition specifically asserts that the deluded also possess
Buddha nature. How can this be?
The
beginning of an answer to this question is the acknowledgment that in
the deluded existential mode Buddha nature is
really just a promise. When, from time to time, the
deluded person acts freely out of Buddha nature, then, in that act of
"purity,''
Buddha nature is fully manifest, fully realized. Outside such moments,
it is only a promise. That this
must be so can be seen when one places Buddha nature
thought in the larger context of Buddhist philosophy. In Buddhism,
"reality" always means "experiential reality." To ascribe reality to
anything outside experience would certainly violate the most basic
Buddhist principles. So to the extent that, in delusion, Buddha nature
is
outside experiential reality (our experiential reality
is the concealing kle`sa), it
is not in any real way
present. It is present only as promise. In this light,
we can look once again at the passage quoted above
from the BNT:
Attachments
are not
real; therefore they are called vacuous. If one
gives rise to these attachments, true wisdom will not
arise. When one does away with these attachments,
then we speak of Buddha nature. (787b)
While the attachments are
experientially present, we do not speak of Buddha nature. Only when
wisdom is experientially present do we speak of it, or claim it.
A
parallel to this reading of the text is found in Sung Bae Park's study
of doctrinal and patriarchal faith in Zen. He
writes:
Whereas doctrinal
faith is the commitment that "I can become Buddha, " patriarchal faith
is the affirmation that "I am
already Buddha.'' Therefore, patriarchal faith is not to be regarded as
a ''preliminary" to enlightenment, as is doctrinal faith, but as
equivalent to
enlightenment itself. To arouse patriarchal faith is to become
instantly enlightened.(
15)
Thus, insofar as the
patriarchal faith that "I am already Buddha" is
equivalent to the realization of enlightenment, one cannot
authentically affirm "I am
already Buddha" until one is enlightened, that is, until one
experientially knows one's Buddhahood. This is the
language of Zen, and the BNT does not speak quite this
way. I believe, though, that the BNT's affirmation, "I, a
deluded person, possess the Buddha nature," must be understood to
function authentically only within the same limits. The statement can
only be made by a person who knows experientially that it is
true.
These statements take us close to the solution of
our problem. While in the deluded existential mode, Buddha nature is
present as promise in two senses, which must be distinguished. First,
of course, there is the
promise of future Buddhahood affirmed for all. Second,
and more imporrant for the present question,
there is the promise that Buddha nature is present to
the deluded person now in the sense that it
can and will appear in its fullness and purity now if only the
deluded person will open his or her eyes and see it.
Thus, to say that Buddha nature is present "only" as a promise while in
the deluded existential mode is not to negate that it is, in fact,
present and real at all times and in all conditions. But it
is up to the deluded person to see that reality, to
"realize" the reality of the Buddha nature for him- or herself now, in
the present moment.
In
this context, we should recall that in the BNT the Buddha nature is
consistently identified with Buddhist practice. Thus, all appearance of
contradiction or
inconsistency is removed when we think of Buddha nature as
equivalent to the Buddhist practice of those
still enmired in the existential dimension of
delusion. Thus, Buddha nature can be present now, in its fullness
and purity, even though it
is not an entity of any
kind and even though one is enmired in the
condition of delusion insofar as it is manifest in acts of practice,
or, in other words, insofar as, and no farther than, one's actions
bring that
Buddha nature into the world of experiential reality.
CONCLUSION
The present essay is
an exercise in cross-cultural philosophy and,
moreover, a demonstration of the fact that cross-cultural philosophy is
today a Western enterprise. I
have taken an ancient Chinese Buddhist text. attempted to explain it in
its own terms, and then lifted it
whole and dropped it into the world of Western
philosophical inquiry. What has emerged from this process is something
new: something that is neither a Chinese Buddhist artifact, nor
something that fits entirely comfortably into
contemporary Western philosophy.
The
views expressed above on the concept of person, and especially on
the existential aspects of this concept, are
only implicit in the text from which I have derived them, but they are
there in potential; they can be deduced and made explicit when the
relevant questions
are applied. They follow directly from the textual material and are
consistent with the general philosophical perspective of East
Asian Mahaayaana Buddhism. I suggest that many Buddhist (and other
Asian) texts should be searched, as I have searched the
BNT, with the questions which a modern Westerner cannot help asking
help in hand, rather than
tucked away. To approach a text with questions derived from a variety
of perspectives (including culturally alien views) is to offer that
text the opportunity to
unfold its potential. To be sure, something new is created in this
process, which should not be
confused with the original text itself, but without this process, the
text is relegated to past history.
NOTES
1. The author wishes to thank Professor Leon Hurvitz for
checking the Chinese translations and making a number of important
suggestions for improvement. Any remaining
errors are of course mine alone.
2. Takasaki Jikido(ao) , "Structure of the Anuttaraa`srayasuutra (Wu
Sbang I Ching(ap) ), " Indogaku Bukkyogaku kenkyuu 8 (March 1960): 35
(his citation of Hattori).
3. Ui Hakuju(aq), Hoshoron kenkyuu(ar) (Tokyo. Iwanami Shoten), 1960,
p. 366. Takemura Shoho(as), Busshoron kenkyuu(at)
(Tokyo: Hyakkaengan, 1978. p. 6.
4. Fo Hsing Lun(a) , in Tarsho shinshuu daizokyo(au) 31, no. 1610:
787-794. Future references to
the
Buddha Nature Treatise will be given parenthetically in the text of the
article. The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the National
Endowment for the Humanities, in the form of a 1985 Summer
stipend, which furthered her research on the Buddha
Nature Treatise, resulting in the present article as
well as a future book-length study of the same subject.
5. The four subjects of contemplation, the four kinds of right effort,
the four steps to super powers, the five spiritual
faculties and their five associated powers, the seven levels of bodhi
(wisdom) , and the eight constituents of the Eightfold Noble Path.
6. As will be explained below, the Thusness of Thusness represents, in
this
text, the mutuality of the
subjective and objective
facets of Thusness.
7. In other words, this section of the article is an inquiry into
what would formerly have been called the text's "concept of man.'' With
the discovery that the
term "man" is a false generic, this phrase is no longer
appropriate. Unfortunately, no phrase has yet been found
to serve as an adequate replacement, although
"philosophical anthropology" probably comes closest in
meaning. In what follows. in place of the question
"What is man?'' I will ask. "What is a person?"
8. For the idea of these two dimensions I am indebted to Joaquin
Perez-Remon. Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism, Reason
and Religion. no. 22 (The Hague: Mouton, 1980).
9. For a more detailed discussion of this passage as well as
further elaboration of the nonentivative, active
quality of the Buddha nature, see Sallie King,
"The Buddha Nature: True Self as Action.'' Relipious Studies
20 (June 1984): 255-267.
10. The author refers to the text as Pao ting ching(av), but it should
be Pao chi ching(aw). (Takemura Shoho(as),
Busshoron kenkyuu(at) (Tokyo: Hyakkaengan, 1978): 157.
11. The sixth consciousness of Yogaacaara thought,
which is responsible for discriminating between "self' and
"not-self."
12. The realms of desire, form, and the formless.
13. I take this translation from Aramaki Noritoshi's paper presented at
the U.S. -Japan Conference on Japanese
Buddhism, Madison, Wisconsin, in 1985. I do not
wish to convey any sense of a Christian conversion experience by my use
of this term; however, I
do intend the connotation of a fundamentally life-altering experience,
a connotation which is
present in the Chinese use of the term.
14. Juan Mascaro, trans., The Upanishads (Harmondsworth, Middlesex:
Penguin Books, 1965), Pra`sna Upani.sad, p. 74.
15. Sung Bae park, Buddhist Faith and Sudden Enlightenment (Albany:
SUNY Press, 1983), p. 19.