201. bslab bya US.
202. rig pa'i bzo gnas. ES lists {rig [pa'i] gnas [chen] lnga: the 5 [major] sciences [branches of traditional Buddhist learning] (1) {nang gi rig pa} = spiritual/ buddhist philosophy, 2) {gtan tshigs kyi rig pa} = dialectics/ logic, [here tshad ma, which is equivalent] 3) {sgra'i rig pa} = grammar, 4) {gso ba'i rig pa} = medicine, 5) {bzo gnas kyi rig pa} = mechanical arts and crafts]].
203. rig gnas chung ba lnga: the 5 minor sciences [[= *{rig pa'i gnas lnga} snyan ngag dang, mngon brjod, sdeb sbyor, zlos gar, skar rtsis te lnga'o]].
204. In this case, since some of these doctrines conflict, both logically and ion their practical goals, so not all them can be The Doctrine.
205. The cause of productive action and dependence of the fruition on the cause.
206. rnam par dpyod.  One can investigate the world in such a way that one becomes discriminating about how to deal with it practically.
207. lam gsum The three realms below, on and above the earth, traditionally this world system of Mount Meru and the four continents plus the celestial [physical, form and formless] realms above and the hells etc. below, hence including all of the six lokas.
208. nog bo chos nyid kyi rigs pa = chos nyid kyi rigs pa= reasoning of nature.
209. chos nyid.
210. gzugs su rung ba.
211. In terms of pleasure, pain, and indifference.
212. The Tibetan is tautological: The definition of 'du byed is 'du byed, it produces conditioned composites of dharmas, samskaras.  These are basic patterns of emotional-behavioral reactiveness from which fully articulated consciousness is built up.
213. don:  It would be alright to say objects, but what is meant includes awareness of self and whatever aspects of situations, actions, and so forth we may apprehend.
214. chos nyid.
215. rang bzhin.
216. kyis OR by.
217. rtogs, not realization of enlightenment here.
218. dngos po'i rdzas.
219. ldog pa'i btags.
220. don gzhan in logic often has the sense of what is opposite to a certain characteristic, like not blue for blue.
221. yongs su gzung ba'i don nam yul: they become objects in the sense of dualistic samsaric objects truly existing from their own side and so forth.
222. rang mtshan rdzas yod.
223. ldog pa.  This word can also mean opposites.  The two usages are related in that the kind of characteristics meant divide things dualistically into eg permanent and impermanent, 1 and many, blue and non-blue, etc and are conceived of as being used so that if the term applies the opposite necessarily does not.
224. rnam par brtags.
225. Verbal and phenomenal characteristics are lumped together in these conceptions, and there is a blurring of what can be properly said of linguistic and conceptual entities and about experiences and objects, even though we claim to believe that nothing can be a common basis of both kinds of characteristics.  Therefore, our everyday statements will not stand up to analysis.
226. ldog pa.
227. 'jug ldog.
228. gnas tshul. Here the term does not refer to the way things are in absolute truth, emptiness, but to how they are in their everyday relative apparent natures.
229. snang ba dang sel ba.
230. ngo bo nyid kyis stong pa nyid: This might literally mean that they are empty of essence, that their essences are empty or that their essences are emptiness.  Generally unless a special point is being made about the emptiness of emptiness etc all of those are taken as equivalent.
231. rang bzhin gyis grub pa...med:  their nature does not [truly] exist, they do not exist intrinsically/ concretely/ spontaneously/ independently/ truly. This is pretty much synonymous with emptiness.  Exactly what this term is taken to mean can vary somewhat with context and school etc.  However to say all things are natureless in terms of the absolute analysis of madhyamaka is not to be simply and directly equated with saying they don't exist, ma grub, in the ordinary relative sense.  All exponents agree on that.  Otherwise things that exist would be existent by nature absolutely, while the term is used so that the natures involved in ascertaining both existence and nonexistence of things are equally rang bzhin gyis ma grub.
232. Emptiness, marklessness and wishlessness, stong pa nyid, mtshan nyid med pa, smon lam med pa.
233. An argument analyzing cause as emptiness like vajra slivers that work their way into and destroy the mountain of wrong views of non-empty true existence, whose reason shows the gate of liberation of marklessness:  Things like a sprout have no true arising, because they do not arise from themselves, something other than themselves, both, or neither [ie without cause].
 In Buddhist logic those possibilities are considered as exhaustive, and denying all of them means that there is no way for things truly to arise at all.  This is classified as a reason of non-observation of a non-apparent related cause, one of the gtan tshigs chen po lnga.
234. mtshan ma med pa.
235. smon pa med pa, 1 of the three gates of liberation.  According to madhyamaka absence of the four extremes of existence or arising follows from arising from causes and conditions = interdependent arising.
236. The third of the 3 gates of liberation.
237. chos nyid.
238. dam bcas.
239. yang dag par khong du chud.
240. The skandhas are the components of samsaric experience which intrinsically involves suffering.
241. 'phrog par byed.
242. sgrub pa'i mtshan nyid.  mtshan nyid can also be definitions.  Translating it that way would be appropriate if the primary model of Buddhist logic was the certainty of tautology, EG a rose is a rose, as it is in western symbolic logic.  However Buddhism uses the model of perception.  A jaundiced person can be mistaken about the color of a white conch because it looks yellow, but cannot be mistaken in that way about its looking yellow.  That kind of certainty is the paradigm for Buddhist logic.  Blatant tautology is actually considered a logical fallacy, as presented below, for the same reason it is considered certain in the west.  Its truth or falsity is independent of anything that may be the case in the world.
243. 'phros don
244. Perception and inference.
245. ji ltar.
246. gsal byed, apprehender.  However the agent in this case is not a person, but a dharma or configuration of dharmas.  What it means to speak of agency in such a situation is defined in detail in the context of abhidharma, but from the viewpoint of ordinary language it might sometimes be better to say cognition or apprehension to avoid confusion with persons and egos.  The meaning is that of abhidharma in either case.
247. gsal bar byed.
248. gsal.
249. phwya ba.
250. bcad shes.
251. 'du bar bshed.
252. gshal bya.
253. rang mtshan, spyi mtshan.
254. rang gi ngo bo: variously translated self-nature, own being etc. svabhava.
255. a'dra ba thun mong.  EG two cars might both be white or they might not.
256. gshal bya mngon gyur.
257. gzhal bya lkog gyur.
258. gzugs bzang, pleasing form & face, a good body.
259. kun rdzob/ samv.riti satya and don dam paramartha satya.
260. rang rang gi ngo bo.
261. This is formless direct perception of emptiness.
262. The first moment of perception is said to be non-conceptual, in the sense of being pure sense conscious unmixed with mental consciousness, which however does arise in the second instant.
263. The explanation is usually given that the mental perception involves a mental image "like" the original perception which is used as a mental "sample" of what sort of thing it is.  The same kind of explanation is given in classical western empiricism.  If this is considered various doubts begin to arise: For example If we could mislabel or misidentify a perception, why would we not do the same with the sample, or make a mistake about the sameness of our sample and the perception.  Empiricism and abhidharma take place on the level where we are satisfied with "sample" analogy and its promise of certain knowledge.  Modern analytic philosophy, and madhyamaka involves not being satisfied with the proffered certainty of that example.
264. Or the definition of a real thing is that which exists with a productive power.  This is from the sautrantika point of view.
265. spyi'i mtshan nyid.
266. don.  Classical buddhist understanding of logic is in terms of the objects or dharmas of abhidharma.  When madhyamaka questions these or limits the scope of their validity, it does the same to buddhist logic.
267. rtog pa.
268. ngos bzung.
269. khyad par du phye ba.
270. sngar ma rtogs pa'i don.
271. Unconfused by obscurity, illusion, etc.
272. gzugs can.
273. 'khrul.
274. Experience as such is just what it is.  It makes no sense to speak of mistakes here.  EG What sense is there is saying  that a person presently stating "this conch looks yellow to me" reports what is experienced?  Perhaps it is a doubt whether this person remembered what the words mean.
275. rtog.
276. rtsing zhib.
277. rigs.
278. According to this account, use of language does not in itself involve conception.  Linking a perceived token or name to a perception or kind of perception is not seen as conceptual.  It seems to follow that there could be a non-conceptual use of language where everything that was said was linked to reality in this way.
279. spel.
280. dbang mngon gyi rgyun mthar.
281. bzhad zin pa'i ngo bo'i rnam pa gzhan shig yod do.
282. khong du chud.
283. blo.
284. gsal.
285. don rig shes pas vs rang rig next.
286. It makes distinctions about it, in particular that it is of something other than oneself, external etc.
287. Self-awareness in the case of dreams is often not known to be such, but thought to be sense perception.
288. yid.
289. rab 'byams.
290. blo mas.
291. bzhad pa and a'jug pa.
292. kyang bshad du med.
293. sgra bshad du med.
294. mtha'.
295. yul shes bzhin du or awareness of objects
296. rang rig.
297. gsal rig: [ apprehending] consciousness.  One can say luminous insight to emphasize the shift in quality and increased energy that comes from not fixating objects as other.
298. rab tu skye ba.
299. gsal dang rig.
300. rig par byed pa la.
301. nges par byas.
302. That is if all these terms are equivalent so that self awareness = non-confusion = ultimate [pure] experience.
303. This is a traditional example like the ox-herding pictures.  At first one may see various signs of an elephant.  Finally one sees the beast itself.
304. mngon sum don rig.
305. tshur mthong tshad ma, as opposed to the pure pramana of the noble ones.
306. mngon du gyur ba.
307. It is worth reminding ourselves sometimes that this doesn't make much sense unless the distinction between existence and true existence is given a special significance.  In ordinary usage the terms would usually be synonymous.  Otherwise it is as satisfying as someone saying, I'll give you a hundred dollars, I just won't really give you a hundred dollars, and then if you complain saying with a supercilious air that you don't understand the subtleties of enlightened logic.
308. don [gyi] spyi: abstract/ generalized characteristics, presented as an exaggerated generic image.
309. rtogs par byed.
310. 'jug ldog.
311.  don spyi.
312. rnam par rtog pa. The same term is often translated discursive thoughts, in which case the meaning is that the conceptions become a rambling, digressive stream; in Buddhism the discursiveness is motivated by karmic attachments to the kleshas..
313. byed las.
314. don rnams la blang dor gyi 'jug ldog.
315. <that are to be analyzed>
316. rtags pa'i tshul gsum.
317. mthun pa'i phyogs.
318. mi mthun pa'i phyogs.
319. Qualification of the subject of the thesis by the dharma established by the reason.
320. It is part of the meaning or definition.  No one who understands the meaning can fail to be sure that this is a valid inference
321. Syllogisms in Indian logic generally involve examples.  This helps eliminate some paradoxes that might arise in unexampled inference.  If there are no unicorns, is it right or wrong or what to say All unicorns are white, or no unicorns are white.
322. rtags de sgrub shes 'dod chos can gyi steng du 'god tshul dang mthun par tshad mas nges pa'i tshul.
323. rjes khyab.
324. ldog khyab.
325. phyogs.
326. Because traditionally in buddhist thought it is said to be not produced and not impermanent.
327. dpe ltar snang, or counterfeit example
328. ldan 'brel and 'du brel.
329. ngo bo...gyis khyab.
330. ldog cha.
331. This seems to echo madhyamaka criticism of the abhidharma notion of the intrinsically single discrete substance.  How can what is intrinsically one have many characteristics?
332. nyer len gyi rgyu.
333. lhan cig byed pa'i rkyen.
334. skye byed gyi rgyu.
335. rnam par bzhag a'jog gyi rgyu.
336. These relationships are said not to withstand madhyamaka analysis for being absolute.
337. bdag gcig a'brel ba.
338. sel.
339. har byung a'gal ba.
340. don.
341. a'gal zla.
342. dgnos 'gal.
343. nye bar mkho ba'i.
344. rtags su bkod pa rtags.
345. la la, which often means sometimes.
346. nyer len.
347. Here having a cause is taken as being part of what it means to be a [sometimes] thing.
348. dmigs rkyen.
349. spu ris phyes pa.
350. <It should be known that>
351. bdag.
352. khyad par.
353. bkod pa khyad par dag pa'i rang bzhin gyi rtags sbyor.
354. gzhan la ltos pa.
355. mi ltos par dag pa.
356. don grub.
357. tha snyad grub.  The connection is between the meanings of the words.
358. ma dmigs pa'i rtags sbyor.
359. mtshan nyid and mtshan gzhi.
360. tshad = measure. OR made into pramana.
361. dpog mi nus.
362. By being claimed to be proved or refuted.
363. shes 'dod chos can.
364. 'brel zla and 'gal zla.
365. khyab byed ma dmigs pa.
366. 'gal dmigs rtags.
367. khyab bya.
368. mes khyab par non pa'i shar gzhir chos can.
369. khyab bya.
370. <the contradictoriness of>.
371.  'gal dmigs kyi rtags.
372. rtag dgnos.
373. grub.
374. dharmin, chos can.
375. phyogs.
376. phyogs chos.
377. khyab ches pa.
378. As above one cannot be certain whether an invisible rakshasa is here.
379. dwogs: fear doubt, uncertainty.  Belief is important in Buddhist reasoning because in debate with persons of other schools arguments often take the form, "If you believe A, than you must/ can't also believe B."  The debate must start with premises accepted by opponents if they are to be convinced.
380. ldog pa tha dad min pa'i thun mong ma nges pa'i rtags.

381. phyogs gnyis ka a'jug pa.
382. mthun phyos and mi mthun phyogs.  A common usage EG for "Sound is impermanent, because it is produced:" the mthun phyogs = impermanent things.  The mi mthun phyogs = permanent things.
383. Two things cannot have a characteristic in common if there are not two things to begin with.  In western logic tautology is often used as the exemplar of necessity.  For Buddhist logic too "son of a barren woman" is an exemplar of something certainly impossible.  However while "parts is parts" is an example of the obious in the west, it seems that in Buddhist logic it is fallacious.  This is more a matter of proper form than it is one of a difference in logical views.  "Parts is parts is not well-formed in Buddhist logic.
384. In the text the examples actually follow below.
385. mnyan bya.
386. rig sgra bzhin lta bu mthun phyogs yod kyang ma mthong.
387. blo ltos lhag ldan thun mong ma nges gi rtags.
388. phyogs gnyis ka la cha gnyis su 'jug pa'o.
389. lhag ldan.
390. That the syllogism is certainly invalid is beside the point here.  What is in question is only the relationship of the reason, being a speaker, to the according and non-according dharmas, omniscience and non omniscience.  It is assumed that if there are Buddhas, they speak.  I suppose mutes that would invalidate the reverse pervasion are also ignored.  (Interestingly enough some sutra passages say that in some of the limitless worlds of the universe beings including buddhas do not literally speak, although they do communicate in other ways.)
391. don gyis.
392. rtags rigs.
393. a'jug tshul.
394. so so rang gis rig par bya'o.  KPSR is very firm about translating the term this way rather than as discriminating awareness or self-awareness.
395. rang gi ngo bo nyis kyis stong pa.  OR empty of their own nature, empty of themselves.  In any case the point is that they and any purported nature of them will not bear madhyamaka's analysis for the absolute
396. rang mtshan.
397. Obviously there is a sense in which it can be expressed, since it has just been done, and Mipham does not regard this statement as self-refuting on its own level.  If an exponent of madhyamaka accepts that it is proper to say "absolute truth is beyond concept" and deny the reverse, one must hold that there must be a level in which it is proper to make valid and invalid propositions, as well as a non-conceptual way to make sense of things, and that it is possible for the two kinds of validity these have to co-exist, because their criteria and meanings are different.  This is in fact Mipham's position
398. yongs chod du.
399. mtshan gzhi. what is characterized, things that are examples of it or to which the definition applies.
400. snang yul du gyur ba'i rang mtshan rnams.
401. In English negation and denial are distinguished from refutation, a valid proof of a negation or denial.  dgag in Tibetan can typically mean either. in same way sgrub can refer to assertion of existence or truth or proof of these.
402. In Buddhist logic affirming negation is like "this is not a horse."  It is understood as presupposing the thing called "this" in such a way that it affirms "This is something other than a horse. Cf, "I am no fool."  Non-affirming negation is like "There ain't no Santa Claus."  It is understood as denying Santa Claus and not affirming anything.
403. rang rgyud.
404. rgol gshan dag.
405. gzhal bya'i gnas lugs.
406. <of this general classification>.
407. chos mthun pa nyid can dang chos mi mthun pa nyid can no.
408. chos mthun sbyor gyi sgrub ngag [[EG what is produced is impermanent,  like a vase, 1 of the {sgrub ngag yan lag gnyis ldan}]].
409.  blo skyon.
410. don skyon.
411. tshig skyon.
412. blo bde.
413. sems med.
414. phyogs dang mthun phyogs gang rung yin pa'i phyir.
415. dam bca'.
416. That is accepted by both disputants.
417. sun 'byin ltar snang.
418. skyon la skyon du brjod.  Either one says there is a mistake where there is none, or one identifies a fault that could be validly refuted, but the reasons one gives are not in fact valid.
419. For logical reasons, rather than because there are reasons but the opponent failed to think of them.
420. Again this is logical rather than a question of what the opponent actually does.
421. mtha' gcig tu khyab.
422. skabs su babs pa'i don.
423. mi srid.  The absolute refutes everything is impossible, but that viewpoint alone loses the distinction between valid and invalid conventional pramana.
424. If one presses the eyeball while looking at the moon one seems to see two moons.
425. Because it deals with distinctions in the conventional or relative spheres all of which do not bear analysis for absolute truth.
426. Or their essence is established as emptiness.  ngo bo nyid kyis stong.  In conventional pramana the two may have a different sense, but here the absolute pramana free  from all complexities of characteristics is meant.
427. de la don dam par ma grub pas so.
428. Here the distinction is not the vision of noble ones vs ordinary beings, but what is normally called true and false by ordinary beings.  Here too someone might argue that Buddhism needs only the distinction between absolute truth and what is not true and does not need the further distinction of what confused beings who know only the conventional truth of the world call true and false.
429. rang gis rang tshugs.  This autonomy is not like proving the existence of God or a first cause in rationalist philosophy so much as a claim that the features of our conceptual structure that madhyamaka uses to establish emptiness are intrinsic to language.
430. yang dag mtha'.
431. The kayas are the object and the perceiver is wisdom.
432. blo gros,
433. <caring for>
434. We will rely on the individual rather than the dharma etc.
435. <course of the>.
436. brda sbyor yin pa'i phyir.
437. skabs don gyi tshig.
438. lhur len.
439. bor: literally thrown away.
440. chos mtshungs: This could mean "It is the same with the dharma."  That does not change the meaning much.
441. 'chel.
442. spros pa lhur len.
443. shing 'on shig.  shing = tree/ wood; 'on = bring take, get, carry.
444. rab tu phyungs.
445. A nyingma translator.

446. dgongs gshi gang la dgongs nas su.
447. See below.
448. thod rgal.  Though the same term is used for a very profound stage of realization in ati, here the connotation is negative.
449. Of suffering.
450. dka' thub.
451. gzhal.
452. rlom
453. cung zad.
454. kha drangs par ma yin pa'i tshul dgos ched dang bcas par rtogs pa.
455. dgongs pa bzhi.
456. mnyam pa nyid: ES: even mindedness
457. don gzhan
458. dus gzhan.
459. intentions concerning other individuals.
460. What one means by and hopes to accomplish by giving a certain teaching etc. dgongs gzhi gzhan lo dgongs pa.  dgongs gzhi gzhan la dgongs pa: intending another intention.
461. The first buddha of this kalpa.
462. bzung, the sense is just hearing, reading etc.
463. Feminists must deal with the fact that traditionally it is said that all buddhas must be male.
464.  The four concealed intentions are bzhugs pa ldem por dgongs pa, mtshan nyid..., gnyen po, bsgyur ba...
465. 'khyog.
466. gnas skabs theg pa gsum.
467. bslab pa rnam gyyengs med la nan tan.
468. dgongs and ldem dgongs.
469. dgongs gshi dgongs nas.
470. spyi don.
471. stegs yin tshul.
472. sgra mthun don 'phags kyi gtan tshigs: cf commentary below.
473. tshad ma bka' gsung.
474. bdag pa chen po.
475. rgyud rnams.
476. These are: dbyings don dam: absolute truth of space/ the dhatu, ye shes don dam: absolute truth of wisdom, and a'bras bu don dam the absolute truth of the fruition, which has the five categories of the body, speech, mind, quality and action of buddhahood. GD.
477. dpyod.
478. {gsung rab kyi yan lag bcu gnyis  12 branches of the [Buddhist] scriptures, 12 kinds of excellent speech (1 {mdo a'i sde}. = general teachings. 2 {dbyangs kyis bsnyad pa'i sde}. = hymns & praises. 3 {lung du bstan pa'i sde}. = prophecies. 4 {tshigs su bcad pa'i sde}. = teaching in verse. 5 {ched du brjod pa'i sde}. = aphorisms. 6 {gleng gzhi'i sde}. = pragmatic narratives. 7 {rtogs pa brjod pa'i sde}. = biographical narratives. 8 {de sta bu byung ba'i sde}. = narratives of former events as examples. 9 {skyes pa'i rabs kyi sde}. = {jataka.m} narratives of former births. 10 {shen tu rgyas pa'i sde}. = extensive teachings. 11 {rmad du byung ba'i sde}. = narratives of marvels. 12 {gtan la dbab pa'i sde}. = teachings in profound doctrines.
479. in tshul khrims, discipline; shes rab, prajna; and sems, mind = meditation GD.
480. gzhol.
481. chu bur, also bubble.
482. gzhol bar shes.
483. <supreme>.
484. gzu bo'i blos]lit by genuine mind/ thoughts.
485. phyag mtshan.
486. "profound and extensive" cut for metrical reasons.
487. rol mtsho are lakes of play of chang curds etc where the naga kings live.
488. The following passage compares the eight treasures of confidence to the eight auspicious symbols.
489. <of the teacher and teaching>
490.  'khyug.
491. spyi brtol..
492. through the ten directions [cut for metrical reasons.